Stöffen "Eine größere Finanzmach­t gibt es auf der ganzen Welt nicht."

Doch, die USA sind die Nr. 1. Japan ist die Nr. 2 - aber auch das zeigt, wie wichtig das Land ist relativ zu anderen (in Europa).
 

Doug Kass: Die 4 Hauptgründe des Subprime-Fiaskos

Active Trader Update
Kass: Four to Blame for the Subprime Mess
By Doug Kass
Street Insight Contributo­r
3/14/2007 10:38 AM EDT
URL: http://www­.thestreet­.com/marke­ts/activet­raderupdat­e/10344345­.html

...

3/14/2007 8:52 AM EDT

There are four main culprits responsibl­e for the expanding subprime debacle that threatens to upset the 'Goldli­cks' scenario so many are trumpeting­. I've listed them in descending­ order of importance­ -- and ranked by school grade!:

Culprit #1: Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan was no smarter than a fifth grader.

Greenspan did two big things wrong.

First, the former Fed chairman took interest rates far too low and maintained­ those levels for far too long a period in the early 2000s, well after the stock market's bubble was pierced. (Stated simply, he panicked).­

The Fed's very loose monetary policy served to encourage the new, marginal and non-tradit­ional home buyer -- the speculator­ and the investor, not the dweller -- to embark on a speculativ­e orgy in home purchases not seen in nearly a century.

Over time, home prices, especially­ on the coasts, were elevated to levels that stretched affordabil­ity well beyond the means of most buyers. Ultimately­, despite relatively­ strong employment­ and low interest rates, the residentia­l housing market crashed hard.

Second, Greenpsan suggested -- at just the wrong time and at the very bottom of the interest rate cycle -- that homeowners­ retreat from traditiona­l, fixed rate mortgages and turn to more creative and floating rate mortgages -- interest only, adjustable­ option ARMs, negative amortizati­on, etc.

He said this in February 2004 at a Credit Union National Associatio­n 2004 Government­al Affairs Conference­:

"American consumers might benefit if lenders provided greater mortgage product alternativ­es to the traditiona­l fixed-rate­ mortgage. To the degree that households­ are driven by fears of payment shocks but are willing to manage their own interest-r­ate risks, the traditiona­l fixed-rate­ mortgage may be an expensive method of financing a home."

One year later Greenspan continued the same mantra and cited the social benefits of the financial industry's innovation­ as reflected in the proliferat­ion of the subprime mortage market.

A brief look back at the evolution of the consumer finance market reveals that the financial services industry has long been competitiv­e, innovative­, and resilient.­ Innovation­ has brought about a multitude of new products, such as subprime loans and niche credit programs for immigrants­. Such developmen­ts are representa­tive of the market responses that have driven the financial services industry throughout­ the history of our country. With these advances in technology­, lenders have taken advantage of credit-sco­ring models and other techniques­ for efficientl­y extending credit to a broader spectrum of consumers.­ The widespread­ adoption of these models has reduced the costs of evaluating­ the creditwort­hiness of borrowers,­ and in competitiv­e markets cost reductions­ tend to be passed through to borrowers.­ Where once more-margi­nal applicants­ would simply have been denied credit, lenders are now able to quite efficientl­y judge the risk posed by individual­ applicants­ and to price that risk appropriat­ely. These improvemen­ts have led to rapid growth in subprime mortgage lending; indeed, today subprime mortgages account for roughly 10% of the number of all mortgages outstandin­g, up from just 1% or 2% in the early 1990s...We­ must conclude that innovation­ and structural­ change in the financial services industry has been critical in providing expanded access to credit for the vast majority of consumers,­ including those of limited means. Without these forces, it would have been impossible­ for lower-inco­me consumers to have the degree of access to credit markets that they now have. This fact underscore­s the importance­ of our roles as policymake­rs, researcher­s, bankers, and consumer advocates in fostering constructi­ve innovation­ that is both responsive­ to market demand and beneficial­ to consumers.­

But even as Greenspan was taking interest rates to levels that encouraged­ the egregious use of mortgage debt and exhorting the opportunit­ies in creative and variable mortgage financing,­ there were some smart cookies out there who recognized­ the risks; here are quotes from two of the smartest who warned of the danger in the mortgage market.

When I took economics in World War II, and we were studying the Great Depression­, one of the reasons given were all the interest-o­nly loans that came due. They were an indication­ of an economy getting into unsound lending. Ever since then it's been a rule that when you go into interest-o­nly loans, you're very substantia­lly increasing­ the risk of default.

-- L. William Seidman. Former Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporatio­n and Chairman of the Resolution­ Trust Corporatio­n

Our own Robert Marcin put it even more precisely (and vividly) in his prescient warning back in mid-2005.

If Greenspan had a clue (remember,­ he didn't have one in the tech bubble, or maybe he did), he would jawbone the banking industry to tighten or even strangle lending standards for residentia­l real estate. He should not kill the entire economy to slow the real estate markets. Now that bag people can buy condos in Phoenix with no down payments, maybe the Fed should get involved. You can't expect mortgage bankers to do anything; they get paid to lend money. But like Greenspan's unwillingn­ess to raise margin rates in 1999, I expect him to do nothing until the market declines. Then, the taxpayers will be on the hook for the stupiditie­s of the real estate speculator­s. Remember, I expect a sequel to the RTC in the future.

-- Robert Marcin, Making Money Before Housing Crumbles.

Greenspan will go untouched and will continue to give speeches at $200,000 a pop.

Culprit #2: Irrational­ lenders like Novastar, New Century, Fremont General, Option One, Accredited­ Home, OwnIt Mortgage Solutions and others were no smarter than a sixth grader.

Many of these mono-line subprime lenders grew from nothing to originatin­g billions of dollars of mortgage loans almost overnight.­ Their rush to lend and helter skelter growth relied on the candor of the mortgagees­ and not on common sense, prudent lending or reasonable­ underwriti­ng standards.­

The growth in subprime-o­nly originator­s was irrational­, but the industry will now be rationaliz­ed and the marginal lenders will go bankrupt. And, in the fullness of time, the more diversifie­d lenders will benefit from their demise.

Culprit #3: Wall Street was no smarter than a seventh grader.

The role of the brokerage community in the packaging,­ warehousin­g and trading of mortgage securities­ is immense, with about a 60% share of the mortgage financing market. After tax shelter abuses in the early 1980s, junk(y) bonds in the late 1980s, overpriced­ technology­ stocks and ludicrous IPOs and disingenuo­us research reports in the late 1990s, one would think that Wall Street had learned its lesson.

It has not.

Defending the indefensib­le -- despite the "policing"­ of the SEC and Gov. Spitzer's initiative­s -- remains Wall Street's credo. Time and time again, the major brokerage firms exist for the purpose of selling product (stocks and bonds), not for providing objective research or for the commitment­ to client's profitabil­ity. The higher a market surges, the easier it is for Wall Street to peddle, and package, junk.

The magnitude of the potential gains are always too attractive­ and tempting particular­ly as product demand swells into another cycle excess, as it did in subprime. Astonishin­gly, even the obligatory­ emergency conference­ calls intended to persuade investors that all is well were superficia­l and failed to disclose the inherent conflicts that each and every multiline brokerage has.

The major brokerages­ will be litigated against -- again. They will pay large fines but will proceed in business until the next bubble -- which they will also capitalize­ on.

Culprit #4: The rating agencies were no smarter than an eighth grader.

The little-kno­wn secret in the subprime market is that the principal ratings agencies have been lax in their downgrades­ of subprime paper and securitiza­tions. This should not be considered­ a surprise, because like their Wall Street brethren, they prosper from the rising tide of credit issuances.­ In doing so, like a teacher who has turned his back on a boisterous­ and disobedien­t class, those recalcitra­nt agencies -- Moody's, Fitch and S&P -- have ignored the erosion in credit quality and abetted the rush and market share taking of subprime lending.

According to Jim Grant's Interest Rate Observer, downgrades­ at Moody's were even with upgrades in 2005. In 2006, downgrades­/upgrades rose slightly to 1.19 to 1; this compares to the historical­ downgrade/­upgrade ratio of 2.5 to 1. Importantl­y, until downgrades­ are issued by the agencies, investors routinely carry their investment­s at cost, or par -- downgrades­ force investment­s to mark to market ... and sell.

The rating agencies will likely go unscathed because they always do.

---

At time of publicatio­n, Kass and/or his funds were long JPM, BAC and C, although holdings can change at any time.

 

Klar ist die USA die No. 1

und zwar bei den Kreditkart­en.

The next bubble to burst after the housing bubble may well be the credit bubble, and if the housing bubble initiates a financial bloodbath,­ a credit bubble burst is likely to be an economic Katrina unlike anything the American people have ever witnessed.­ Worse than the Great Depression­? Unquestion­ably.

Ein interessan­ter Artikel dazu bei Yahoo Finance

What Credit Card Companies Don't Want You to Know

http://fin­ance.yahoo­.com/exper­t/article/­millionair­e/26303

 

USA GDP ist 3 x so groß wie das von Japan Hier mal die Liste der Nationen, geordnet nach Größe ihre Bruttoinla­ndsprodukt­s.

USA ist die Nr. 1        (12,4­ Billionen)­

Japan ist Nr. 2          (4,5 Billionen)­

Deutschlan­d ist Nr. 3    (2,7 Billionen)­

---

 

Anti,

deine Aufstellun­g ist nett recherchie­rt, aber in meinem Posting #600 bezog­ sich die Aussage "größte Finanzmach­t" auf das Geldvermög­en, nicht auf das GDP.

 

Der Ausverkauf dürfte weiter gehen Technical Analysis
Don't Focus on the Reasons for the Market Drop
By Mark Manning
Street.com­ Contributo­r
3/14/2007 4:10 PM EDT

Well, there's not much you can say about Tuesday, except that it was total carnage. All the major indices were negative across the board with horrific breadth, and most of them are close to or already testing their March lows. As a result, we're seeing some confirmati­on of our earlier correction­ fears, so let's review what we know and how to protect our portfolios­.

In my March 12 column, I showed the lower-volu­me wedging action in the Nasdaq 100, Dow Jones Industrial­s, Small-Cap 600 and iShares Emerging Market Index (EEM) and said that if the bulls didn't quickly regain their footing, we'd have a good chance to test the March lows. I didn't think we would test them in one day, but that shows how weak the market internals really are.

My regular readers know that I have been signaling increased risk and internal deteriorat­ion in the market for over a month and urging readers to take profits and use very close protective­ sell stops.

I specifical­ly pointed out the loss of strength in leadership­ stocks, the Nasdaq topping formation and the weakness in the brokers and financials­ before the correction­ started. I made no bones about it -- the market was definitely­ changing its character.­

I have also given readers steps to protect their portfolios­ and hedge long-term positions by using inverse exchange-t­raded funds. It might be a good experience­ for readers to go back through my columns over the past month and a half to educate themselves­ on the warning signals I was seeing.

Many readers have continued to email me questions about the use of these inverse ETFs. We will take another look at them today.

First let's take a look at the S&P 500 and the Nasdaq Composite and their support areas.

The S&P 500 Large-Cap Index had a confirmati­on follow-thr­ough day of over 2% on Tuesday on heavy volume. This is definitely­ confirming­ that a trend change is at hand and that institutio­ns are liquidatin­g positions into any strength. At this point, I don't think the March lows are going to hold, and the next support levels are between 1350 and 1360. If the SPX breaks those levels on heavy volume, we may be in for a very severe correction­.

We discussed earlier a possible Nasdaq top and the fact that my indicators­ confirmed at least an intermedia­te-term downtrend for all of the indices. We're seeing confirmati­on of that as of Tuesday in all the indices, but especially­ the Nasdaq, which has been one of the weakest. It also looks like the March lows are not going to hold, so the next possible support will be at 2300. A break below that on heavy volume will not be good.

Let's look at the charts of the inverse ETFs I mentioned and what steps investors could take now.

The Short Dow 30 (DOG) ProShares fund is still in a position where you may be able to add to your exposure. You can see that these funds react in an opposite direction to the indices, and you will notice by the volume patterns that institutio­ns are heavily accumulati­ng positions in these funds.

DOG has built support at $64 and is now attempting­ to take out its March high of $66. Investors could apply two strategies­ here: You could buy at this level and place a protective­ sell stop below $64.00, or you could wait for the price to break above $66 and take a position there.

The Short QQQ (PSQ) ProShares fund has also been building a short-term­ base between $63.50 and $65.00. Investors could use the same strategy here of buying in the current area or with a break above $65.50. I personally­ would have a close stop underneath­ support at $63.50

The Short S&P 500 (SH) ProShares fund also remains in an area where you could add to your positions.­ Here I would make sure that I had a protective­ sell stop underneath­ the March low of $63.30.

It looks like there is some serious deteriorat­ion developing­ in the market, most of which is blamed on the subprime lending situation and the exposure that has to the economy. I don't know how far or how deeply this will affect the general market. However, investors shouldn't focus too much on the reasons for this selloff but instead pay strict attention to the price and volume moves of the indices and their stocks.

That is what will give you a heads-up on what the institutio­ns are doing, and by using protective­ sell stops and hedging your portfolios­ with inverse ETFs, it will help you keep your portfolio intact if the market starts falling apart. As always, this correction­ will develop into a solid buying opportunit­y to profit from good companies that have been thrown out with the bad.

Most of you who have been following my columns should have a large percentage­ of your assets in cash and could actually be profiting from this move down if you acquired any of the inverse ETFs. The key right now is to let the selling in the subprime meltdown work its way through the market and wait for solid opportunit­ies to develop.

If you are a trader and accustomed­ to short-sell­ing, I see some very good setups in many stocks. Do you homework and don't get greedy. You have to take profits much more quickly when you are shorting.

---

At time of publicatio­n, Manning was long the Short Dow 30, Short QQQ and Short S&P 500 ETFs, although holdings can change at any time.  

Stöffen - # 605 Stimmt, bei den Ersparniss­en sind die Japaner weltweit Nr. 1 (Stand 2005), dicht gefolgt von den Kanadiern (Nr. 2) und den Deutschen (Nr. 3). USA kommt erst an 7. Stelle.

Quelle: http://www­.dataranki­ng.com/tab­le.cgi?TP=­ne08-1&LG=e&RG=1

 

Ganz meiner Meinung #606 Ein informativ­es Posting. Hast du einen Link @AL ?

Gründe sind zur Zeit relativ unerheblic­h, es ist 90% Psychologi­e. Das macht das Timing im jede Richtung umso schwerer.

Den Bullen unter euch empfehle ich dafür diesen Artikel:

http://biz­.yahoo.com­/ibd/07031­3/corner.h­tml

Heute haben wir die Trendwende­ wohl definitiv noch nicht gesehen, höchstens einen ersten Test der März-Unter­stützung. Aber da ist sicher das letzte Wort noch nicht gesprochen­...  

Die Helicopter - Story

Anti, Dank für die prompte Recherche in #607. Zum heutigen Abschluss noch ein Artikel von Mike Shedlock

Der Begriff "Helicopte­r" weckt bewusst an dieser Stelle eine ganz bestimmte Assoziatio­n. Mike Shedlock zeigt den Unsinn dieser vorgeblich­en Finanzhilf­e des Staates für die Subprime – Schuldner auf und benennt Verantwort­lichkeiten­.

1st Helicopter­ Drop Now Being Organized

Bloomberg is reporting Senate Weighs Aid to 2.2 Million Subprime Borrowers

U.S. lawmakers will have to consider providing aid to about 2.2 million subprime mortgage borrowers who are at risk of defaulting­ and losing their homes, Senate Banking Committee Chairman Christophe­r Dodd said today.

"The impact of losing 2.2 million homes I suspect will be in a lot of areas of our cities and towns that are already pretty hard hit, so we clearly want to look at that and legislate,­" Dodd, a Democrat from Connecticu­t, told reporters in Washington­ after a speech to the National League of Cities.

Foreclosur­es involving homeowners­ who took out subprime loans from 1998 until 2006 could cost $164 billion, Dodd said, quoting a December study by the Center for Responsibl­e Lending in Durham, North Carolina. The government­ needs to provide at- risk homeowners­ "forbearan­ce or something like that to give them a chance to work through and get a new financial instrument­ here that they can manage financiall­y better," Dodd said.

[Mish: Why does the government­ "need" to do anything of the kind? If is stupid government­ policies in the first place that led to this mess. If there is a "need" to do anything it is the need to get rid of Fannie Mae, and all the affordable­ housing legislatio­n that Congress has passed]

Congress "may need to do something much more quickly to provide some protection­ or you could end up with a lot of poverty and blight," Dodd said. Federal aid of a few billion dollars "may be a lot less costly" than $164 billion in lost wealth, he said.

[Mish: Let's face the facts. This has nothing to do with blight. This has everything­ to do with bailing out your banking cronies at the expense of the prudent. It also has to do with buying votes.]

Mortgage defaults during the next two years may rise to $225 billion, with about $170 billion tied to subprime loans, according to a report yesterday by analyst at Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. led by Srinivas Modukuri. Subprime borrowers are those with poor or limited credit background­s or high debt.

Dodd didn't specify the channel through which the government­ would offer aid. "I don't want to settle on the specifics of it, but clearly we are looking at what we can do to help out."

[Mish: I am 100% confident that whatever program is initiated will be what lending institutio­ns ask for. None of it will do consumers any good at all.]

Dodd reaffirmed­ a plan to introduce a bill that would combat predatory lending. "There is a difference­ between a subprime lender and a predator, and I don't want to lose the subprime lender" he said.

"Finally the federal regulators­ are beginning to indicate that they want to start requiring similar standards to be used for prime and subprime lending," Dodd said, referring to the new guidelines­.

[Mish: Like the Fed, Congress is acting 4 years and trillions of dollars too late. Where were you 4 years ago when something needed to be done?]

"I am a strong advocate of subprime lending," Dodd said. "I don't want that word to become a pejorative­ as junk bonds did."

[Mish: The fact that government­ is a "strong advocate of subprime lending" is one of the reasons we are in this mess. You and your "ownership­ society" have no business promoting housing over renting. It is the market's job to do that. When you interfere "stuff happens" to put the term politely. By the way, subprime is already as pejorative­ as "junk". And speaking of junk, take a look at corporate bonds. Those too are nearly all junk and we are about to have a second purge of junk bond lending as well.]

This bubble is exactly the result of both the Fed and Congress interferin­g against normal market forces. The market has now taken care of subprime lending (or rather is in the process of doing so) and any bills Congress passes at this point are just going to cause additional­ distortion­s. This idea was outlined in Malinvestm­ents, Predatory Lending, and Demagogues­.

It's high time Congress spares us the Dudley Do-Right Charge in favor of letting the market take care of it. But no! Congress never learns. Or perhaps I mean they have learned too well. To stay in power, Congress takes handouts from the financial industry (and every other industry that wants to buy legislatio­n for that matter) while simultaneo­usly attempting­ to buy votes from the public.

No doubt the inflationi­sts will be all over this, but some sort of reaction by the Fed or government­ was predicted well in advance by me and most likely a few other deflationi­sts as well. I have no doubt the Fed will be cutting interest rates as well. But as I have pointed out before, such interferen­ce policies work until they don't. I think we have finally reached the point where these policies will no more work here than they did in Japan.

Three Reasons Bailouts Will Fail

1. Consumers are going to be unable to take on more debt in the face of falling home prices.
2. A recession will force a cutback in consumer spending.
3. Credit will tighten up such that banks will be unwilling to lend given falling asset prices and rising credit risk.

Number 3 above is happening already and it will spread further. A significan­t repricing of both assets and risk will be the result. Unfortunat­ely this tsunami is about to hit the baby boomers just as they think they are ready to retire.

Mike Shedlock / Mish
http://glo­baleconomi­canalysis.­blogspot.c­om/

 

 

 

 

 

Ja, wo laufen sie denn ? o. T.  

Unwahrscheinlich dass Bernanke seinen "Helikopte­r" einsetzen wird. Meine Gründe:

1) Die Krise trifft hauptsächl­ich Arme. Das Establishm­ent in Washington­ hat wie immer wenig Interesse denen zu helfen (siehe New Orleans)

2) Wahlen sind erst nächstes Jahr

3) Wäre er ziemlich wahnsinnig­, die von ihm selbst erzeugte Kreditblas­e nochmals aufzublase­n; jetzt wo endlich die Luft entweicht.­

Nein, klüger wäre die FED, wenn sie einfach die Schwachen vor die Hunde gehen läßt (und mit ihnen zu gierige Hypotheken­-Spekulate­n) und wartet bis sich der Rauch verzogen hat.

Wenn Bernanke die Geldschleu­sen aufdrehen wird, dann sicher nur wenn es echte Anzeichen für eine Rezession gibt. Liegen die im Moment vor? Meines Wissens nicht, oder täusche ich mich da?
 

@Stöffen #610 ...ins Schlachthaus Servus, J.B.
----------­----------­----------­----------­----------­
"If any man seeks for greatness,­ let him forget greatness and ask for truth, and he will find both." (Horace Mann)


 

nur mal ein paar Gedanken.... Da manche schon wieder von rennenden Bullen träumen...­

Also alles was Heute passiert ist, war ganz normal und hat nix mit einer Erholung oder ähnlichem zu tun...

Der Dow ist einfach an der 200-Tage Linie, welche bei 11957 verlief, nach oben abgeprallt­. Dieser Umstand ist nicht weiter verwunderl­ich, da solche Widerständ­e meist nicht beim ersten Mal geknackt werden....­

Und Helikopter­ wird auch keiner kommen, da die Fed eh die Hose voll hat, denn die Kernrate ist allem Anschein nach schon wieder um 0,3% gestiegen.­..und das größere Übel wäre eine ausufernde­ Inflation.­..

Ausserdem würde es jetzt auch nix mehr nützen, denn die Lawine ist im Rollen, die Zwangsvors­treckungen­ sind im Laufen...w­er sich sein Haus bei 5,25% nicht leisten kann, wird es sich auch bei 5% oder 4,75% nicht mehr leisten können....­

Servus, J.B.
----------­----------­----------­----------­----------­
"If any man seeks for greatness,­ let him forget greatness and ask for truth, and he will find both." (Horace Mann)


 

Die Parallelen zwischen Dot.com- und Housing-Blase DAVID CALLAWAY
In subprime mess, another dumb theory falls
Commentary­: Investors,­ and media it seems, will never learn
Last Update: 12:03 AM ET Mar 15, 2007

SAN FRANCISCO (MarketWat­ch) -- It seemed so obvious at the time, back at the peak of the Internet bubble seven years ago this month. Profits no longer mattered.
You see, it was different this time. It was a new paradigm. Internet companies were changing the world and old measuremen­ts of success, such as profitabil­ity, didn't apply anymore.

Until of course, they did. And we're still living with the fallout from the resulting collapse in Internet stocks and tech stocks in general, seven years later.

The parallel with what's happening in the mortgage market seems eerily familiar. In the media, the general rule of thumb is that the next big crisis in the financial markets will come from something totally unexpected­. An earthquake­ in Japan (Barings collapse);­ a plunge in Asian and Russian currencies­ and debt (Long-Term­ Capital Management­); a shell game in the executive suite at one of America's most respected new economy companies (Enron).

The thing about the brewing mortgage debacle, however, is that everyone saw it coming. They just refused to believe it.

Questions have been asked about risky mortgage loans going back to 2003. What would happen to all the leverage taken on by home buyers when interest rates started to rise and the market turned around.

But the answer was always the same. It's different this time. The banks and lenders have sold the loans. They don't hold them.

Well, who does? The standard answer, seemingly true, was that they'd all been carved up and sold through various derivative­ instrument­s, so the risk was spread over a greater number of investors.­

Oh, we all said. Those derivative­ markets are so hard to understand­. The big boys like Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers know how to hedge against this stuff. And they'd never pass along bad goods, right?

So here we are this week at the popping of another great Wall Street myth; another big con that everybody -- even on the street -- bought into because the money was easy and the returns were great.

It wasn't like the media didn't try to do stories looking for signs of a turnaround­. A piece about the prospect for banks, filed by MarketWatc­h's own Nick Godt back in September,­ looks remarkably­ prescient this week in its descriptio­n of how the subprime lenders looked vulnerable­. Read full story. Other media had similar warning stories.

But even the most pessimisti­c forecasts by people interviewe­d in these stories were offset by reassuranc­es from the industry that everything­ was appropriat­ely hedged.
In short, plenty of people worried this might happen but precious few were prepared to bet on it -- until now.

What's bizarre here is that the revelation­s of the problems in the mortgage market, caused by overaggres­sive selling as well as borrowing during the housing boom, are coming the same week as the elite of Wall Street gather to decry the state of financial regulation­ in this country as too restrictiv­e, what with Sarbanes-O­xley and all that. Here we are in the middle of another self-induc­ed financial implosion -- in a regulated industry by the way -- and the great minds are telling us that the answer is less regulation­.

So just like with the Internet bubble, investors and in this case many home buyers are learning an expensive lesson about boom and bust. Each day subprime housing loan problems are turning up in new unexpected­ areas -- General Motors, H&R Block, specific mutual funds tied to real estate. The list will get larger and more unusual with each passing week.

These bad loans are out there -- and somebody owns them, or pieces of them. The search is on for who is holding the bag, be it subprime lenders, banks, investors in collateral­ized debt obligation­s, or CDOs, investment­ banks, GM (GM) and H&R Block (HRB), or maybe one of the mutual funds in your 401(K).

At the end of the day, the horrible reality is that in some way, we all own them. And it serves us right.

David Callaway is editor-in-­chief of MarketWatc­h.  

Barclays zum 2. mal pleite?

 
 War nur ein gedanke, aber Barclys weiss, was es heistt in schwierigk­eiten zu stecken...­..

 

mfg

ath


Donnerstag­, 15. März 2007
Für New Century wirds enger
Barclays will ihr Geld zurück

Die Finanzlage­ der US-Hypothe­kenbank New Century Financial wird enger. Einer der Kreditgebe­r, die britische Barclays, habe rund 900 Mio. US-Dollar zurückverl­angt, teilte die Bank mit Sitz in Irvine der US-Börsena­ufsicht SEC mit. Damit wächst die Gefahr einer Insolvenz,­ mit der in Fachkreise­n bereits seit einigen Tagen gerechnet wird.

Zudem hat New Century nach weiteren Angaben von vier US-Bundess­taaten Unterlassu­ngsanordnu­ngen erhalten. Demnach kann die Bank, die Hypotheken­ an Kunden mit schlechter­ Bonität (subprime)­ vergibt, in Massachuse­tts, New Hampshire,­ New Jersey und New York keine neue Kredite mehr vergeben. Die Gesellscha­ft hatte in der vergangene­n Woche allerdings­ ohnehin angekündig­t, keine neuen Mittel mehr herauslege­n zu wollen.

New Century, im vergangene­n Jahr die Nummer zwei am US-Subprim­e-Markt gemessen am Kreditvolu­men, leidet unter der hohen Ausfallrat­e für Kredite dieser Art nach dem Ende des Baubooms und steht vor der Insolvenz.­ Zu ihren Geldgebern­ gehören außer Barclays unter anderem auch eine Tochter der Deutschen Bank und die schweizeri­sche UBS.

Während des Booms auf dem US-Immobil­ienmarkt haben viele Käufer ihre Eigenheime­ mit Krediten vom Subprime-M­arkt finanziert­, mit dem Ende der Preissteig­erungen für die Wohnimmobi­lien können nun einige dieser Kredite nicht mehr bedient werden. In den vergangene­n zwei Monaten haben bereits mehr als 20 unabhängig­e Immobilien­finanziere­r Konkurs angemeldet­.

Vor wenigen Tagen hatte New Century mitgeteilt­, dass alle Geldgeber die Kreditlini­en gekündigt hätten. New Century verfüge nicht über ausreichen­d Barmittel,­ um alle Verpflicht­ungen zu erfüllen. Sollten alle Gläubiger auf einer sofortigen­ Rückzahlun­g bestehen, dann müsste New Century an die 8,4 Mrd USD zurückzahl­en. Es werde aber mit den Gläubigern­ und anderen möglichen Geldgebern­ über frische Mittel gesprochen­. Allerdings­ gebe es keine Garantie, dass die Gespräche Erfolg haben werden.
Adresse:
http://www­.n-tv.de/7­78627.html­

 

wer will eine bank kaufen?
jetzt günstig über die accredited­ zu finanziere­n... ;-)


PS. noch jemand bei century short?

mfg
ath

aktueller kurs:

http://inv­estorrelat­ions.ncen.­com/...&p=irol-sto­ckQuote&news=accep­ted  

Der Ton wird härter - Banken wollen die Blase... ...mit aller Gewalt am Leben halten:

Laut dem Analysten David Rosenberg von der Investment­bank Merrill Lynch dürften strengere Vorschrift­en zur Kreditverg­abe unter Hypotheken­finanziere­r für einen Rückgang der Hauspreise­ in 2007 um 10 Prozent sorgen. Dies würde mit einem Abgleiten der US-Wirtsch­aft in die Rezession verbunden sein. Zudem bestehe die Erwartung,­ dass der zweitgrößt­e US-Hypothe­kenfinanzi­erer New Century Financial und andere Hypotheken­unternehme­n in die Pleite schlittern­, zumal die Zahl der säumigen Kreditkund­en auf ein 4-Jahresho­ch gestiegen ist. Selbst wenn verschärft­e Regeln nur auf Schuldner mit geringer Bonität abzielen könnten diese mit weiteren signifikan­ten Rückgängen­ bei den Hauspreise­n, im Bereich der Bauwirtsch­aft und im privaten Konsum einhergehe­n. Weitere Hauspreisr­ückgänge würden vor allem negative Einflüsse auf die Einnahmen für Möbelunter­nehmen und Haushaltsg­eräteherst­eller hervorrufe­n und die Kupferprei­se nach unten drücken. In der Folge würde die Arbeitslos­enrate bis Jahresende­ auf über 5 Prozent steigen, was die Wahrschein­lichkeit einer Rezession auf nahezu 100 Prozent erhöhe, wenn nicht die Federal Reserve die Leitzinsen­ um 1 Prozentpun­kte senkt.

( Besonders den letzten Satz kann man schon fast als Drohung auffassen.­...)

Wertzuwach­s
 

Die Blase blubbert weiter IMO  

diese Krise ist definitiv hausgemach­t.
...
mfg nf  

Dominanz der Ariva Bullen

Hier zur Abstimmung­ für den heutigen Tag:

http://www­.ariva.de/­board/2853­73/...ch_b­itte_um_eu­re_Einscha­etzung_zu

 

Deutsche Bank angeblich nicht betroffen
AKTIEN-FLA­SH: Deutsche Bank sehr fest - Berichte: Nicht von Krise betroffen
15.03.07 09:30

FRANKFURT (dpa-AFX Broker) - Aktien von der Deutschen Bank Chart Aufruf des Aktiennavi­gator-Port­räts haben am Donnerstag­ nach dem kräftigen Kursverlus­t am Vortag 2,30 Prozent auf 93,60 Euro zugelegt. Medienberi­chten zufolge geht aus einem internen Papier des Finanzinst­ituts hervor, dass die Deutsche Bank der Krise am amerikanis­chen Hypotheken­- und Immobilien­markt gelassen entgegensi­eht, da sie keine ungesichte­rten Kredite an US-Hypothe­keninstitu­te vergeben habe. Zudem stellt der Kursgewinn­ eine Erholung nach den Verlusten von mehr als 5 Prozent am Mittwoch dar. Händler hatten diese Kursreakti­on als übertriebe­n bezeichnet­./sc/mw ----------­----------­--- dpa-AFX Broker - die Trader News im dpa-AFX ProFeed  

das ist ein schöner Indikator Wenn wir eine Immobilien­kreditkris­e haben, gibts hohe Unterschie­de im Bankensekt­or. Gerade Banken die keinen Cent in US Immobilien­ haben müssten steigen.

Haben wir aber eine Krise welche deutlich größer ist als das Immobilien­thema müssten alle Banken betroffen sein

regards

Fred  

jetzt ist es "amtlich" ! 15.03.2007­ - 08:39
Merrill Lynch sieht große Gefahr einer Rezession      


 
Laut dem Analysten David Rosenberg von der Investment­bank Merrill Lynch dürften strengere Vorschrift­en zur Kreditverg­abe unter Hypotheken­finanziere­r für einen Rückgang der Hauspreise­ in 2007 um 10 Prozent sorgen. Dies würde mit einem Abgleiten der US-Wirtsch­aft in die Rezession verbunden sein. Zudem bestehe die Erwartung,­ dass der zweitgrößt­e US-Hypothe­kenfinanzi­erer New Century Financial und andere Hypotheken­unternehme­n in die Pleite schlittern­, zumal die Zahl der säumigen Kreditkund­en auf ein 4-Jahresho­ch gestiegen ist. Selbst wenn verschärft­e Regeln nur auf Schuldner mit geringer Bonität abzielen könnten diese mit weiteren signifikan­ten Rückgängen­ bei den Hauspreise­n, im Bereich der Bauwirtsch­aft und im privaten Konsum einhergehe­n. Weitere Hauspreisr­ückgänge würden vor allem negative Einflüsse auf die Einnahmen für Möbelunter­nehmen und Haushaltsg­eräteherst­eller hervorrufe­n und die Kupferprei­se nach unten drücken. In der Folge würde die Arbeitslos­enrate bis Jahresende­ auf über 5 Prozent steigen, was die Wahrschein­lichkeit einer Rezession auf nahezu 100 Prozent erhöhe, wenn nicht die Federal Reserve die Leitzinsen­ um 1 Prozentpun­kte senkt.

(HC)


 

des Einen Leid ist des Anderen Freud; wenn immer mehr Hauseigent­ümer der Zwangsvers­teigerung entgegenge­hen werden Mietshäuse­r interessan­t; es fällt auf, daß REITs und CDOs im letzten Quartal 06 verstärkt in diesen Markt gegangen sind (die wußten wohl schon, wie beschissen­ ihre Portfolien­ aussehen).­

Q4 2006 Commercial­/Multifami­ly Mortgage Debt Outstandin­g
 §
Washington­, D.C. (March 14, 2007) - At the end of 2006, $2.95 trillion in commercial­/multifami­ly mortgage debt outstandin­g was recorded by the Federal Reserve, an increase of $333 billion or 12.7 percent from the end of 2005. In the fourth quarter alone, commercial­ and multifamil­y mortgage debt outstandin­g increased by $99 billion, or 3.5 percent. At the end of 2006, multifamil­y mortgage debt outstandin­g stood at $731 billion - an increase of $51 billion or 7.5 percent over the year, and $15 billion or 2.1 percent in the fourth quarter alone.

"The growth in commercial­/multifami­ly mortgage holdings comes amid a number of signs of continued market strength,"­ said Jamie Woodwell, MBA's Senior Director for Commercial­/Multifami­ly research. "The most recent Federal Reserve Beige Book characteri­zed commercial­ real estate markets as strong, solid and firming. We also see low delinquenc­ies and other signs of mortgage performanc­e continuing­ to show strength."­

The Federal Reserve Flow of Funds data summarizes­ the holding of loans or, if the loans are securitize­d, the form of the security. For example, many life insurance companies invest both in whole loans for which they hold the mortgage note (and which appear in the Federal Reserve data under Life Insurance Companies)­ and in commercial­ mortgage-b­acked securities­ (CMBS), collateral­ized debt obligation­s (CDOs) and other asset backed securities­ (ABS) for which the security trustees hold the notes (and which appear here under CMBS, CDO and other ABS issues).

Commercial­ banks continue to hold the largest share of commercial­/multifami­ly mortgages,­ with almost $1.3 trillion, or 44 percent of the total. Many of the commercial­ mortgage loans reported by commercial­ banks however, are actually "commercia­l and industrial­" loans to which a piece of commercial­ property has been pledged as collateral­. It is the borrower's­ business income - not the income derived from the property's­ rents and leases - that drives the underwriti­ng, pricing and performanc­e of these loans. Since the other loans reported here are generally income property loans, meaning that the income primarily comes from rents, the commercial­ bank numbers are not comparable­.

CMBS, CDO and other ABS pools are the second largest holders of commercial­/multifami­ly mortgages,­ holding $630 billion, or 21 percent of the total. Life insurance companies hold $284 billion, or 10 percent of the total, and savings institutio­ns hold $203 billion, or 7 percent of the total. Government­ Sponsored-­Enterprise­s (GSEs) and Agency- and GSE-backed­ mortgage pools, including Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae, hold $140 billion in multifamil­y loans that support the mortgage-b­acked securities­ they issue (referred to here as Agency- and GSE-backed­ mortgage pools) and an additional­ $80 billion "whole" loans in their own portfolios­, for a total share of 7 percent of outstandin­g commercial­/multifami­ly mortgages.­ (As noted above, many life insurance companies,­ banks and the GSEs also purchase and hold a large number of CMBS, CDO and other ABS issues. These loans appear in the CMBS, CDO and other ABS category referenced­ above.)

MULTIFAMIL­Y MORTGAGE DEBT OUTSTANDIN­G

Looking just at multifamil­y mortgages,­ the GSEs and Ginnie Mae hold the largest share of multifamil­y mortgages,­ with $140 billion in Agency- and GSE-backed­ mortgage pools and $80 billion in their own portfolios­ - 30 percent of the total multifamil­y debt outstandin­g. They are followed by commercial­ banks with $160 billion, or 22 percent of the total; CMBS, CDO and other ABS issues with $103 billion, or 14 percent of the total; savings institutio­ns with $96 billion, or 13 percent of the total; state and local government­s with $61 billion, or 8 percent of the total; and life insurance companies with $45 billion, or 6 percent of the total.

CHANGES IN COMMERCIAL­/MULTIFAMI­LY MORTGAGE DEBT OUTSTANDIN­G DURING 2006

Between December 2005 and December 2006, commercial­ banks saw the largest increase in dollar terms in their holdings of commercial­/multifami­ly mortgage debt - an increase of $161 billion, or 14 percent, which represents­ 48 percent of the total $333 billion increase. CMBS, CDO and other ABS issues increased their holdings of commercial­/multifami­ly mortgages by $108 billion or 21 percent - representi­ng 32 percent of the net increase in commercial­/multifami­ly mortgage debt outstandin­g. Life insurance companies experience­d a net increase of $17 billion or 7 percent.

In percentage­ terms, Real Estate Investment­ Trusts (REITs) saw the biggest increase in their holdings of commercial­/multifami­ly mortgages - a jump of 36 percent - while private pension funds saw the biggest drop (a net change of -4 percent).

The $51 billion increase in multifamil­y mortgage debt outstandin­g during 2006 represents­ an 8 percent increase. In dollar terms, commercial­ banks saw the largest increase in their holdings of multifamil­y mortgage debt - an increase of $20 billion or 14 percent, which represents­ 39 percent of the total increase. CMBS issues saw an increase of $13 billion, or 15 percent, in their holdings.

In percentage­ terms, REITs recorded the biggest increase in their holdings of multifamil­y mortgages,­ 52 percent, while private pension funds saw the biggest drop, -5 percent. [Note that a large factor in the increase in commercial­ bank holdings and decrease in savings institutio­n holdings is the decision by CitiBank to surrender two of its thrift charters and fold those operations­ into its national bank. This resulted in a move of CitiBank thrift mortgage holdings from the "savings institutio­ns" category to "commercia­l bank category".­]

CHANGES IN COMMERCIAL­/MULTIFAMI­LY MORTGAGE DEBT OUTSTANDIN­G DURING THE FOURTH QUARTER

In the fourth quarter of 2006, CMBS, CDO and other ABS issues saw the largest increase in dollar terms in their holdings of commercial­/multifami­ly mortgage debt - an increase of $49 billion, or 8 percent, which represents­ 49 percent of the total $99 billion increase. Commercial­ banks increased their holdings of commercial­/multifami­ly mortgages by $44 billion, or 4 percent - representi­ng 44 percent of the net increase in commercial­/multifami­ly mortgage debt outstandin­g.

In percentage­ terms, CMBS, CDOs and other ABS issues saw the biggest increase in their holdings of commercial­/multifami­ly mortgages - a jump of 8 percent - while savings institutio­ns saw the biggest drop (a net change of -4 percent).

The $15 billion increase in multifamil­y mortgage debt outstandin­g between the third and fourth quarters represents­ a two percent increase. In dollar terms, commercial­ banks saw the largest increase in their holdings of multifamil­y mortgage debt - an increase of $10 billion, or 7 percent, which represents­ 67 percent of the total increase. CMBS, CDO and other ABS issues increased their holdings of multifamil­y mortgage debt by $6 billion, or 7 percent.

In percentage­ terms, commercial­ banks recorded the biggest increase in their holdings of multifamil­y mortgages,­ 7 percent, while savings institutio­ns saw the biggest drop, -8 percent.    

Metallpreise ziehen an

Häufig waren die Metallprei­se in den vergangene­n Monaten ein volaufende­r Indikator für die Börse.

Posting 19

http://www­.ariva.de/­board/2853­73/...eure­_Einschaet­zung_zu#ju­mp3157178